INTRODUCTION
Playing an important role in the financial integration process, cross-border banking brings many benefits, especially regarding risk allocation and risk diversification. Financial institutions are less liable to be influenced by shocks affecting domestic markets due to the geographically diversified loan books and deposit bases, which reduce the volatility of their cash-flows. Other benefits may arise from a tight competition and a greater stability within the banking system. For example, foreign banks that invest in less develop markets may accelerate the privatization process of banks owned by the state and may introduce advanced risk management practices which can initiate a faster resolution procedure of the nonperforming loans (NPLs).
On the other side, cross-border banking activities may also involve costs that affect the financial stability. As foreign banks are in general connected with a more mobile capital compared to domestic financial institutions, they might destabilize the financial soundness in the host country, mainly due to contagion effects arising from external shocks. Emter, Schmitz and Tirpák (2018), for example, highlight the contagion effects from national banking markets across the European Union and provide evidence that large NPLs ratios were a crucial obstacle to cross-border lending after the crisis. In spite of this, the consensus in the literature, is that the integration of financial markets via cross-border banking produces a net benefit overall, with exceptions in the situations where cross-border exposures are too large.
Due to the wave of M&A in Europe, the systemic risk imposed by individual G-SIBs is considerably higher now, compared with the preview's decade, therefore it is important to know the individual risk of default of each G-SIB. Knowing the main determinants of the Z-score might help improving the financial soundness of the banking sector by reducing the individual systemic risk of banks in EU therefore reducing the entire systemic risk of the region.
The main question from which this study originated is the following: What are the determinants of the bank solvency risk and what effects it generates on the probability of bankruptcy Using a panel dataset, we examined the determinant of the Z-Score for GSIBs in the European Union and EEA. As proxy for the dependent variable we used distance to default expressed through Z-score. The main regressors are Tier 1 Capital Ratio, Net Interest Income, and Size of the bank, Loans to Deposits Ratio, Leverage Ratio, Non-Performing Loans Ratio and Funding Structure. In addition, we considered system-specific regressors that represent banks' interconnectedness, complexity, infrastructure and cross-jurisdictional activities. Alternatively, we used a subset of the dataset in order to control if the period 2008-2009 is relevant for the individual Z-score. Furthermore, I test if profitability, capitalization, or country are relevant for the individual Z-score of the banks. The methodology used is Panel Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with fixed effects.
The contribution of this study to the scientific literature goes in two directions. First, we identified the main determinants of the probability of bankruptcy of European G-SIBs banks. Secondly, we used various subsets of the dataset to examine the possible asymmetric effects of these determinants on banks' distance to default, by exploring the following channels of shock transmission: profitability, capitalization, euro area membership, and sovereign debt crisis.
The rest of this paper has the following structure: Section 2 discusses the related literature, Section 3 describes the dataset and the methodology employed, Section 4 presents the empirical methodology and results and Section 5 offers conclusions.
RELATED LITERATURE
Although the number of papers that assess the impact of cross-border banking activities on macro financial stability have increased rapidly in the last period, the empirical literature with reference to the impact of cross-border banking activities on macro financial stability in inconclusive. Furthermore, cross-border banking has increased rapidly in the last years. Shin and Shin (2011) highlight that cross-border banking has been a crucial factor of the 2007-2009 financial crisis build-up phase, as European banks provided significant intermediary services for USA banks.
On the subject of consolidation in the banking market and cross-border banking, the viewpoints are contrasting. On one hand, the supporters of stability perspective consider that large banks, with monopolistic tendencies, may increase profits in concentrated banking markets through higher capital buffers (Boyd, De Nicoló and Smith, 2004) . In another study, Boot and Thakor (2000) , demonstrate that a usual practice of larger banks is credit rationing because focusing on greater quality of credit investments in a lower volume will enhance the return of investment and further strengthen financial soundness. These types of banks are considered to acquire comparative advantages regarding the monitoring of lending process due to the high volume of data that they possess.
On the other hand, the promoters of the fragility perspective theorize that larger banks have a higher probability to receive subsidies because of the too big to fail status. Due to this behaviour, the lack of incentives to guard against risk is even more severe for the managers of large banks who may undertake risky strategies considering that government has a high propensity to provide interventions to the banking market. Cross-border banking is an eminent feature of the Eurozone monetary union. As stated in Poutineau and Vermandel (2015) , between 1999 and 2012, a surge in cross-border loans has been observed. This surge is more pronounced between Eurozone countries than between the Eurozone and EU members, and tremendously more than across countries not included in the European Union. The increase in cross-border lending had its peak in 2008, when transfrontier loans were about 300% of the level from 1999.
Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) provide empirical proof that a greater concentration of the banking market is negatively associated with financial stability, using aggregate data of financial institutions from countries within the EU-25 covering the period 1997-2005. To reflect the financial soundness of banks they employed the Z-score measure. Also, they showed how capital regulations can promote financial stability.
DATA
In this study, we analyze an international sample of banks for the period 1995-2018. Data from banks' financial reports are retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database. Our sample is limited to banks that publish their balance sheets and income statements to ensure a relatively high quality and transparency of data. Supervision.The data set consists of a group of 33 large banks with headquarters in 11 countries members of the European Union. The list of banks included in the study complies with the European Banking Authority (EBA) guide on the requirements for the publication of systemic global indicators. Under the provisions of EBA, all EU financial institutions that have exceeded EUR 200 billion leverage in 2017, were selected for study. In addition to the data collected from the Thomson Reuters Eikon database, we have used the ECB 2018 report for the period 2013-2017. From this report, we have extracted data for banks' interconnectedness, infrastructure, complexity, and cross-jurisdictional activities. A complete explanation of the variables employed in the empirical specifications is given in Appendix 2. In order to determine banks' distance to default (Z-score), the period considered for the study is from 1995 to 2018. The dependent variable is Z-score and is calculated with the following formula:
Appendix 1. Banks present in the dataset
(1) ROA represents the return on assets ratio (Net profit over Total assets) and CAR represents the capital ratio (Equity over Total Assets). Mean(ROA) and SD(ROA) are empirical estimates of the average and standard deviation of return on assets. Higher Z-scores are related with greater soundness of banks and a reduced probability of bankruptcy. In the empirical specifications, we employ the natural logarithm of the Z-score because its distribution tends to be highly skewed, as shown in Demirgüc-Kunt, Detragiache and Tressel (2008).
Z-score was developed by Roy (1952) as a measure of financial soundness for banks. It is widely used in the scientific literature (see for example Hannan and Hanweck (1988) , as well as Boyd, Graham and Hewitt (1993)).
The evolution of bankruptcy risk during the analysis period is shown in Figure 1 . The figure illustrates an increase in the probability of bankruptcy in 1998, which corresponds to the Asian financial crisis, and 2008, which corresponds to the global financial crisis. In order to identify key determinants of the Z-score we considered the following regressors: the size of the banks (logarithmic value of the Total Assets), the funding Structure (Total Deposits over Total Liabilities), Tier 1 Capital adequacy ratio (Risk-Weighted Capital Tier 1 over by Risk-Adjusted Assets), and, the lending activity (Net Loans over Total Assets). Balance Sheet data has been extracted from the Thomson Reuters -Eikon database. Other regressors considered in the study are the proxies for banks' interconnectedness (Intra-Financial System Assets, Intra-Financial System Liabilities, and Securities Outstanding), banks' infrastructure (Assets under Custody, Underwriting Activity, and Payments Activity), banks' complexity (Trading and Available for Sale Securities, OTC Derivatives, and Level 3 Assets), and banks' cross-jurisdictional activities (CrossJurisdictional Claims and Cross-Jurisdictional Liabilities). The data used for these variables was obtained from the ECB's 2018 report. The report contains data collected over the period 2013-2017. In Appendix 3 we provide descriptive statistics for all the variables employed in the study. 
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
Li, Tripe and Malone (2017) prove that Z-score is effective in determining the individual risk and systemic risk of a bank.
We started by analyzing the relationship between the Z-score and Capital Tier 1. To eliminate the risk of underestimation of the distance to default (because the Z-score does not follow the normal distribution pattern) we used the natural logarithm of the variable Z-score, similar to Demirgüc-Kunt, Detragiache and Tressel (2008) approach. In the regression analysis, we used the Least Squares method, with bank level Fixed Effects. The formula for the main regression model is:
The regression analysis began with the examination of the impact of the core capital adequacy ratio; we further added the size of the bank expressed by the logarithmic value of the total assets and the logged value of the net interest income (Column (1), Table 1 ). Next, we added other variables for risk and efficiency that have been identified as determinants of financial instability in the scientific literature ( ) in columns (2) to (9), Table 1 . We used as proxy for total net revenue because it has a better explanatory power over the dependent variable than the logged value of total net revenue. This variable is obtained using the natural logarithm of net interest income.
is calculated by dividing total deposits to total liabilities. This variable conveys the influence of the funding structure on the financial stability.
is introduced into the model in order to assess the impact of net loans to total assets ratio. We also investigated the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis and membership of euro area using two dummy variables.
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the years 2008 and 2009 and the value 0 for any other year.
is also a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 for euro area banks and the value 0 for non-euro area banks. In addition to these variables, we added the variables that represent banks' interconnectedness, complexity, infrastructure and cross-jurisdictional activities. The estimated models with the latter stated variables have fewer observations since data for these variables is available only for 2013-2017 period. For greater accuracy of empirical models and easier interpretation of coefficients, we have divided the latter mentioned variables to the total asset.
In Table 1 , we present the main results for the regression estimations made. The most interesting results are from the columns (6) to (9) .
The empirical specifications are estimated using an OLS model with fixed effects.
represents fixed effects at the bank level and is the error. The main results are to be found in Table 1 . Table 2 lists the regression results using sub-samples datasets. We have reevaluated the base model, replacing the with the variable . represents the indebtedness level of a bank. The description of this indicator is to be found in the BASEL III Capital Adequacy Accord. Using dummy variables, we have divided the dataset into three categories: profitability, capitalization, geographical location (with further two more subcategories: membership of Eurozone and banks that have headquarters in countries that undergone the European Sovereign Debt Crisis) The empirical results from Table 1 highlight the fact that the size of the bank has a negative impact on the bank's distance to default. This is not surprising given that there are several studies indicating that the size of the bank adversely affects its profitability (Beck et al., 2006a) . The dataset is made up of systemically important banks; this might be another reason for this result. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the distance to default, bank size and capitalization. Total Equity and Capital Tier 1 have a strong positive impact on Z-score. Basel III calls for Capital Tier 1 to be more than 6% at any given time, for a bank to be considered well capitalized. The source of bank income also is an important channel in influencing financial stability.
illustrates the positive impact of net interest income on Z-score at bank level in columns (1) to (5) . In column (4) the negative impact of the financial crisis of 2008-2009 is highlighted. In columns (6) to (9) we analyzed the system-specific characteristics of banks and the impact of this characteristics on the Z-score. In the BIS methodological report, in 2014, in partnership with BCBS, five categories of indicators for measuring the systemic importance score were established. In Table 1 , columns (6) - (9) we measured the importance of four of these categories, namely: interconnectivity, substitutability, complexity and cross-border activity. Among the characteristics of systemically important banks, AFS transactions and titles, as well as Cross-border Claims, have a significant influence on the distance to default.
The results presented in Table 2 are consistent with previous results. These models using subsamples datasets, illustrate the importance of propagation channels, through which the impact of the previously analyzed variables on Z-score can be enhanced. It can be noticed that for banks with profitability below the sample average (column 1), bank size is an important determinant of Z-score, and that for profitable banks (column 2) it becomes insignificant. For well-capitalized banks, above the sample average (column 4), the impact of the crisis has a strong negative effect, while less-capitalized banks are not influenced by the crisis. The degree of indebtedness is relevant in all estimated models, except for banks that belong to countries that have undergone the sovereign debt crisis (column 8). Instead, membership of euro area does not influence the relationship between the banks' risk profile and their solvency in a significant way compared to the non-euro area (columns 5 and 6). This result hints the harmonization of banking regulations between the two European regions.
As future research proposition, we intend to examine the impact of the regulatory and supervisory framework at national and international level on the relationship between banks' characteristics and individual distance to default. For example, in Căpraru et al. (2016) the association between banking market concentration and an increase probability of default among banks is highlighted. This study also points out that this negative effect can be reduced by employing a stricter supervisory framework.
CONCLUSIONS
Exploring the different ways in which the individual characteristics of banking institutions could influence Z-score and using a panel dataset, we examined the determinants of the distance to default for systemically important banks from the European-banking sector. In the regression analysis, we have used the least squares method, with fixed effects at bank level. The main regressors are: Capital Tier 1, Net Interest Income, Size of the Bank, Lending Activity, Leverage Ratio, NPL ratio and Funding Structure. Alternatively, we used sub-sample datasets to identify whether other events are relevant to the individual Z-score of the banks.
The size of cross-border banks has a negative effect on financial stability. When it comes to banking institutions of this size, it is very important to take into account the systemic risk they impose on the entire financial system. Empirical results have shown that the degree of indebtedness is a good indication of the financial stability of a banking institution and that compliance with BASEL III requirements is necessary. A higher rate of Capital Tier 1 was found to generate a beneficial impact on financial stability. Empirical results highlight the impact of banks' specific factors on the bankruptcy probability. This model could allow regulators to assign more precisely bank's individual risk potential and therefore could reduce systemic risk in the regional banking system.
In addition, in this paper we have found no evidence of a negative link among the factors determining systemic importance and financial stability in the absence of financial shocks (e.g. post-crisis period).
Regarding future research directions, we propose to introduce banking sector characteristics such as the degree of concentration, competition and regulatory and supervisory frameworks implemented by central banks to identify possible channels through which banks' characteristics influence financial stability.
